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THE RULE OF LAW: BEYOND CONTESTEDNESS 
1. PART I: INTRODUCTION 
In this paper I propose a novel—theory agnostic—elemental approach to the 
initial identification of Rule of Law non-compliance.  I argue that, by identifying 
common aims that undergird the most frequently cited conceptions of the Rule of 
Law, it is possible to look beyond the contestedness that is all too apparent in de-
bates regarding the Rule of Law’s conceptual content.  In taking this approach, it is 
possible to identify two elements that reflect fundamental needs that are commonly 
held across all canonical conceptions.   
The Rule of Law is undoubtedly a contested concept.1  The conceptions 
themselves have been described as not only “often conflicting and not infrequently 
rather confused”.2  The Rule of Law’s contested nature is problematic for many rea-
sons; not least of which are the potential analytical unclarity, confusion and loss of 
pragmatic benefit that follows the contest of such a widely cited concept.  To look 
beyond the contestedness, it is necessary to look beyond the widely cited Rule of 
Law desiderata; to do this, it is argued, it is necessary to identify the fundamental 
needs each thinker intended to satisfy in formulating those desiderata.  Through 
identifying the fundamental need that was being addressed, and by considering each 
of the most widely cited Rule of Law ideas, the identification of commonalities in the 
fundamental need is possible.  This allows the distillation of two Rule of Law ele-
ments:  Comprehension and Procedural Pellucidity.  (The elements’ operation is not 
exclusive even though they exist, and overlap, on a spectrum between processes and 
outcomes:  Procedural Pellucidity—at the processes end of the spectrum—relates to 
norm-makers and appliers; and Comprehension—at the outcomes end—relates to 
norm followers.)3  The elements: are derived from within the DNA of canonical Rule 
of Law conceptions; can be identified across canonical conceptions; and, reflect the 
fundamental needs communicated by each canonical author.  In consequence of the 
way that the elements are derived, satisfaction of both elements is necessary for 
                                                 
1 For a detailed summary of the debate, see Jeremy Waldron, ‘Is the Rule of Law an Essentially Contested 
Concept (in Florida)?’ (2002) 21 Law and Philosophy 137. 
2 Andrei Marmor, ‘The Rule of Law and Its Limits’ (2004) 23 Law and Philosophy 1, 1.  
3 I explore the nature of the overlap in section 4.2.  
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Rule of Law compliance regardless of which canonical conception is preferred or 
considered.  Accordingly, should either be absent in the normative commands of a 
sovereign power or in relation to the operation of a legal system more generally, 
Rule of Law compliance cannot follow.  In these terms, the elements’ formulation 
and application enables the initial and immediate identification of non-compliance 
with any canonical idea of the Rule of Law.  Why is this important?  In circum-
stances where, despite the debate and the lack of any agreed definition of the con-
cept, apex courts across the Common Law world frequently reference the Rule of 
Law’s importance,4 and as the level of contestedness seems capable of hindering re-
search and the concept’s theoretical application,5  bringing clarity to the debate to-
gether with ease of application of the concept is vital.  The elements derived in this 
paper address this problem by providing a new way to evaluate Rule of Law compli-
ance through identification—at an early stage and in a theory-agnostic way—of 
Rule of Law non-compliance that avoids becoming bogged in the quagmire of con-
testedness that is apparent in the literature.   
 
In debates regarding the Rule of Law’s conceptual content it could be seen as 
being generally agreed that the concept, whatever else it may be, relates to the im-
position of a normative constraint upon the exercise of power.  But this—overly 
broad generalisation—could be seen as being practically useless for assessing com-
pliance with the concept.  Yet, when the concept’s canons’ more specific definitions 
are considered, the contest regarding the concept’s content becomes intense.  This 
results in various contests regarding both the concept’s application and operation 
and its content that relate to, inter alia, whether the Rule of Law should be applied in 
an international sphere6 or whether the Rule of Law should be construed in formal 
                                                 
4 Regina v Secretary of State for the Home Department, Ex Parte Pierson (1998) AC 539 575.  Planned Parenthood 
of Se Pennsylvania v Casey (1992) 505 US 833.  (O’Connor, Kennedy & Souter, JJ.) (Opinion of the Court).  See 
also Bush v Gore (2000) 531 US 98, 128–129.  Regarding the US Supreme Court’s interest and focus on the 
Rule of Law, see Paul Burgess, ‘“[The Rule of Law]” in the US Supreme Court: The Elephant in the Court 
Room?’ (2016) 8 Hague Journal on the Rule of Law 421.  
5 Adriaan Bedner, ‘An Elementary Approach to the Rule of Law’ (2010) 2 Hague Journal on the Rule of 
Law 48, 49; Ryan E Carlin and Rodolfo Sarsfield, ‘Rethinking the Rule of Law: Concepts, Measures, and 
Theory’ (2012) 33 Justice System Journal 125, 125–130.   
6 Simon Chesterman, ‘An International Rule of Law?’ (2008) 56 American Journal of Comparative Law 
331; Jeremy Waldron, ‘Are Sovereigns Entitled to the Benefit of the International Rule of Law?’ (2011) 
22 European Journal of International Law 315.     
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or substantive terms.7   (Formal terms relate to the processes of enacting a law;8 sub-
stantive terms relate to other considerations including, for example, democracy, liberty 
and freedom.)  There are also fine grained debates regarding the concept’s content as 
some suggest a Rule of Law conceptual core exists,9 others consider it is an essen-
tially contested10 or, at least, deeply contested concept.11   The formulation of the 
idea itself is frequently illustrated at the most basic level in the various ‘laundry 
lists’ of desiderata.  Whilst this practice has become popular,12 a contest remains as 
to which list (and criticisms of the same) to adopt.  Whilst the authors frequently in-
cluded as part of the debate have been described as a “‘[w]ho’s who’ of Western po-
litical thought”13—and include figures like Aristotle, Hobbes, Locke, Dicey, Hayek, 
Fuller, Dworkin, Raz, Radin and Waldron—the formulations posed by, or at-
tributed to, these thinkers often conflict and overlap.  To assess Rule of Law compli-
ance, one is required to either have recourse to each and every canonical conception; 
select aspects of one of various ideas; or create a novel Rule of Law conception.  
However, each method poses a problem.  Creating a purpose built Rule of Law con-
ception has the advantage of precisely delimiting the boundaries of the conception, 
but this is labour intensive and impractical for most projects.  Hybrid laundry lists 
of (relatively) uncontroversial desiderata avoid this impracticality,14 but they may be 
criticised for cherry-picking desiderata tailored to support a desired conclusion.  For 
                                                 
7 Paul Craig, ‘Formal and Substantive Conceptions of the Rule of Raw an Analytical Framework’ [1997] 
Public Law 467.  See also Brian Z Tamanaha, On the Rule of Law History, Politics, Theory (Cambridge Uni-
versity Press 2004) 91.     
8 See, for example, Raz’s desiderata: Joseph Raz.  Joseph Raz, The Authority of Law: Essays on Law and Mo-
rality (2nd edn, Oxford University Press 2009) 214–219.   
9 See for example, Brian Z Tamanaha, ‘The History and Elements of the Rule of Law’ [2012] Singapore 
Journal of Legal Studies 232.  See also, Lisa M Austin and Dennis Klimchuk (eds), Private Law and the Rule of 
Law (Oxford University Press 2014) 1.  Further examples regarding the centrality of arbitrariness and the 
exercise of power can be seen in Krygier’s work: Martin Krygier, ‘The Rule of Law: Legality, Teleology and 
Sociology’ in Gianluigi Palombella and Neil Walker (eds), Relocating the Rule of Law (Hart 2009); Martin 
Krygier, ‘Tempering Power’ in Maurice Adams, Ernst Hirsch Ballin and Anne Meuwese (eds), Bridging Ide-
alism and Realism Constitutionalism and Rule of Law (Social Science Research Network 2016).  (Forthcoming.) 
10 Waldron, ‘Is the Rule of Law an Essentially Contested Concept (in Florida)?’ (n 1); Richard H Fallon 
Jr, ‘“The Rule of Law” as a Concept in Constitutional Discourse’ (1997) 97 Columbia Law Review 1, 7.  
11 Margaret Jane Radin, ‘Reconsidering the Rule of Law’ (1989) 69 Boston University Law Review 781, 781. 
12 A non-exclusive list would include: Raz (n 8) 214–219; Lon L Fuller, The Morality of Law (Yale University 
Press 1964) 46–94; Jeremy Waldron, ‘The Concept and the Rule of Law’ (2008) 43 Georgia Law Review 1.  
13 Jørgen Møller and Svend-Erik Skaaning, The Rule of Law: Definitions, Measures, Patterns and Causes (Pal-
grave Macmillan 2014) 2. 
14 See Chesterman (n 6) 343; Waldron, ‘Are Sovereigns Entitled to the Benefit of the International Rule 
of Law?’ (n 6) 316.  See also Stéphane Beaulac, ‘An Inquiry into the International Rule of Law’ (2007) 14 
(2007) European University Institute Working Papers, MWP 1, 8–10. 
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these reasons, and as there is no agreement regarding the correctness of any single 
theory, none of these approaches facilitate a practical solution beyond immediate 
criticism. In other words, the contestedness means there is no practical and prag-
matic way to immediately determine if an action contravenes the Rule of Law in all 
of its most widely cited conceptions or in terms that is not open to immediate criti-
cism.  By being conceived at a greater level of abstraction, the Rule of Law elements 
I identify exist beyond the Rule of Law desiderata and the contest regarding these 
specific aspects of the ideas.  In taking this approach—and by focusing on what is 
common in the goals, and not just the canonical conceptions’ desiderata or the simi-
larities in those desiderata—the problems that stem from the concept’s contested-
ness can be avoided and a way to identify non-complinace becomes apparent.  
My investigation is heuristic,15 with an intent to distill the ends inhering in 
canonical thinkers’ conceptions and not on the intrinsic function the concept of the 
Rule of Law (as a concept) fulfils16.  I do not claim to identify what the Rule of Law 
is; as, in consequence of the methodology I adopt, that would necessarily require the 
canonical conceptions to be accurate statements of what the Rule of Law is.  In this 
respect, whilst describing the Rule of Law in terms of its elements is not new,17 my 
approach is novel. I argue two elements can be distilled from the common needs that 
undergird the most frequently cited conceptions of the Rule of Law (what I will call 
‘canonical’ conceptions.) The elements can be defined in these terms: 
Comprehension:  That an individual be able to comprehend the nature, con-
tent and operation of the rules to which he or she is subject.  
Procedural Pellucidity:  The creation and application of any rules must be in terms 
capable of being clear and obvious to all concerned.  
                                                 
15 My methodology has much in common Bedner’s: Bedner (n 5).  However, the meaning of ‘element’ dif-
fers.  (Bedner’s meaning is in terms of Rule of Law 'basics' or 'principles'.)   
16 It is in this respect that the methodology I adopt differs from previously suggested teleological ideas of 
the Rule of Law.  See, for example, Krygier, (n 9). and Martin Krygier, ‘Law as Tradition’ (1986) 5 Law 
and Philosophy 237.      
17 See, for example, Tamanaha (n 9) 232; Bedner (n 5); Christopher May, The Rule of Law: The Common 
Sense of Global Politics (Edward Elgar Publishing 2014) 33. 
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The elements provide a clear conceptual lens through which to assess Rule of 
Law non-compliance in a way that avoids the concept’s contestedness.  The failure 
to satisfy either or both elements is sufficient—but not necessary—for Rule of Law 
noncompliance to result.  As the failure to satisfy the elements is not a necessary 
condition of noncompliance, this failure is not the only way Rule of Law noncompli-
ance may result. The elements are, however, necessary—but not sufficient—for 
Rule of Law compliance.18  By virtue of their necessary location in any Rule of Law 
compliant scheme (regardless of the canonical conception preferred), the elements 
provide—in relation to the problems referred to above—one way to pragmatically 
and practically—and without immediate criticism—assess Rule of Law non-compli-
ance.  The project could be described as theoretical Esperanto:19 bringing together the 
existing theoretical languages of the various canonical Rule of Law ideas and trans-
lating their meaning into a new—derived—theoretical language capable of achiev-
ing the same ends as the original language in terms that remain agreeable to all.  
This process does not determine ultimate compliance with the Rule of Law nor does 
it outline the only instances of non-compliance—as other factors may determine or 
impact these outcomes—it merely facilitates immediate identification of non-compli-
ance.  This small step is useful in addressing the problems outlined above.  
 To frame the solution posed in this paper, I first, in Part II, delineate the 
boundaries of the study before outlining my methodology.  In Part III, I evidence 
the distillation of the elements from the canonical conceptions.  In Part IV, I 
preempt some criticisms of the proposed scheme before concluding my argument in 
Part V. 
2. PART II: THE RULE OF LAW 
But there is no real consensus on the form of Rule of Law contest.  The ever 
growing number of conceptions result in varying levels and forms of contestedness 
across the Rule of Law ideas.  The variety of ideas has been put in these terms: “… 
                                                 
18 I thank the anonymous reviewer for highlighting the importance of clearly stating the full necessary 
and sufficient sides of this equation.  
19 I am grateful to Dan Carr of the University of Edinburgh for suggesting a term that so clearly illus-
trates my conceptual processes.   
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the rule of law may not be a single concept at all; rather, it may be more accurate to 
understand the ideal of the rule of law as a set of ideals connected more by family re-
semblance than by a unifying conceptual structure.”20   What is, nevertheless, clear 
is that there appears to be an ongoing contest between the various Rule of Law ideas; 
this extends across both time and geography.21 This has led suggestions that the 
Rule of Law is deeply contested22 or essentially contested (in the Galliean sense).23  
Whilst Jeremy Waldron’s 2002 paper is most frequently cited as authority for this 
position,24 he makes no mention of essential contestedness his recently authored 
‘Rule of Law’ entry in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.25  In this sense, the 
essential contestability of the concept is not settled and could itself be contested.  In 
this paper, I do not seek to challenge the question of essential contestability and the 
Rule of Law, nor do I need to.  The distillation of the elements derives from beyond 
the contestedness—whatever form it may take—to identify a commonality in the ca-
nonical authors’ apparent fundamental need.  On this approach, the conceptions 
themselves are not linked and the contest between them—at the level of the concep-
tions’ desiderata—is not resolved.  
2.1 Formally framing the discussion 
I adopt only a formal consideration of the Rule of Law.  In explaining why 
this approach is adopted, it is useful to consider F. A. Hayek’s definition of the Rule 
of Law: 
[S]tripped of all technicalities this means that government in all its actions is 
bound by rules fixed and announced beforehand-rules which make it possible to 
foresee with fair certainty how the authority will use its coercive powers in 
                                                 
20 Lawrence B Solum, ‘Equity and the Rule of Law’ (1994) 36 Nomos 120, 121.   
21 Chesterman (n 6) 340. 
22 Radin (n 11) 781.   
23 Waldron, ‘Is the Rule of Law an Essentially Contested Concept (in Florida)?’ (n 1); Fallon (n 10) 7.  
24 Waldron, ‘Is the Rule of Law an Essentially Contested Concept (in Florida)?’ (n 1); Tamanaha (n 9) 232; 
Møller and Skaaning (n 13) 2. 
25 Jeremy Waldron, ‘The Rule of Law’ in Edward N Zalta (ed), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 
2016, 2016) <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2016/entries/rule-of-law/> accessed 24 September 
2016.   
  Page 8 of 28 
given circumstances and to plan one’s individual affairs on the basis of this 
knowledge.26 
Hayek’s statement has been described as ‘one of the most powerful formula-
tions of the ideal of the rule of law’.27  It is difficult to conceive of a more succinct yet 
general exposition.  Yet, this—formal (or ‘thin’)—idea could be criticised for exclud-
ing any substantive ideas.  This criticism is echoed when the formal Rule of Law is 
criticized for failing to prevent the enactment of evil laws.  This arises in relation to 
the Hart-Fuller debate and, in particular, when interpretations of Fuller’s view—
that immoral laws should not have legal force28—are considered.  However, the use 
of a formal approach to Rule of Law consideration is not without merit29 as it avoids 
both the contamination of an examination by substantive considerations30  and the 
muddying of conclusions by the inclusion of additional factors under the Rule of 
Law umbrella term (as occurs in substantive conceptions).31   Accordingly, in circum-
stances where the goal is to clearly identify the elements of the Rule of Law, it 
makes sense to start from a thin base.  Further, as formal ideas of the concept pro-
vide a foundation for any substantive conception and as the elements I propose are 
necessary (but not sufficient) components of the formal conception, should the ele-
ments not be satisfied in its formal conception, they could not be satisfied in or sup-
port any substantive conception.  Putting this another way, failure to satisfy the ele-
ments results in a failure to satisfy the Rule of Law regardless of whether conceived 
in formal or substantive terms.  For these reasons, a formal conception is enough to 
address the problem—that, as a result of the contestedness of the concept, there is 
no practical way to assess Rule of Law non-compliance—raised in this paper.  
2.2.  Rule of Law Elements  
In this section, I suggest it is possible to infer from a canonical author’s 
choice of desiderata, and the author’s situation more broadly, the fundamental need 
                                                 
26 Friedrich A von Hayek, The Road to Serfdom (Bruce Caldwell ed, University of Chicago Press 2007) 
112. 
27 Raz (n 8) 210.   
28 Waldron, ‘The Concept and the Rule of Law’ (n 12) 17.   
29 Charles Sampford, ‘Reconceiving The Rule of Law for a Globalizing World’ in Spencer Zifcak (ed), 
Globalisation and the Rule of Law (Routledge 2005) 19.   
30 See Chesterman (n 6) 360. 
31 See Craig (n 7) 469.  (Summarizing the argument made by Raz (n 8).)  In relation to the exclusion of 
democracy and human rights from Rule of Law ideas, see Tamanaha (n 9) 233–236.    
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that the Rule of Law theory was aimed at addressing.  I describe the inference neces-
sary to make the move from canonical Rule of Law laundry lists of desiderata to the 
elements of Comprehension and Procedural Pellucidity.   (The distillation of the ele-
ments will take place in the next part.)  
Tool analogies are popular in the Rule of Law debate.  After distinguishing 
one, I will use two to illustrate my point.  Joseph Raz, famously, suggests a knife is 
only a knife if it has some ability to perform its necessary function: for a knife, an 
ability to cut.32  Raz considers the various virtues that may exist in relation to the 
satisfaction of a particular end.  As the present enquiry considers there may be a 
number of potential ends, Raz’s analogy can only precisely relate if an idea is read 
into his proposition that there could be a number of other tools able to achieve the 
same ends: for Raz, cutting.  However, in arguing that Margaret Radin’s portrayal 
of Fuller’s work as an instrumental conception of the Rule of Law may be mistaken, 
Jeremy Waldron provides a tool related analogy that does assist.  As it is referred to 
throughout this paper it is worth extracting in full: 
If one wanted to cut down a large tree with an axe, one would have to be sure 
that the axe was heavy and the head rigid.  Heaviness and rigidity in an axe are 
desiderata for doing things with axes, particularly the things that axes are nor-
mally used to do. It does not follow, however, that the heaviness and rigidity of 
one’s tools are general desiderata for cutting down trees.  For one might opt to 
use a two-handed saw – and then maybe lightness and flexibility would be one’s 
instrumental virtues.  If the two-handed saw is a better tool than the axe for 
chopping down some tree… then the fact that certain features are desiderata in 
a good axe does not amount to a general instrumental justification for those fea-
tures.33 
 Waldron’s suggests that ends alone do not justify Rule of Law theories and 
desiderata alone cannot provide definitive and general justification for the features. 
Two questions posed by Waldron reflect this: which tool is most efficacious for the 
goal in mind? and, given the selection of a certain kind of tool, what attributes of 
                                                 
32 Raz (n 8) 225–226.  See also, Paul Burgess, ‘Neglecting the History of the Rule of Law: (Unintended) Con-
ceptual Eugenics’ (forthcoming) Hague Journal on the Rule of Law. 
33 Jeremy Waldron, ‘Why Law - Efficacy, Freedom, or Fidelity?’ (1994) 13 Law and Philosophy 259, 
261–262. 
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that tool best serve the goal?34  These questions do not preclude the inquiry that I 
propose: that the purpose and intent behind the choice of tool can be inferred from 
the tool’s attributes and the context of the situation more generally.  Waldron’s 
questions illustrate the structure of any theorist’s formulation of a Rule of Law the-
ory would differ based on that theorist’s appreciation of the problem.35  That appre-
ciation would, in turn, impact the selection of the theory scheme (as a tool) and the 
associated Rule of Law desiderata (as the tool’s instrumental virtues).   It would fol-
low, where the Rule of Law is contested and a variety of laundry lists of desiderata 
exist, without knowing any theorist’s precise conception of the problem a direct 
comparison (of tools or tools’ instrumental values) would render the examination 
subject to the same problem identified by Waldron.  In effect, comparing an axe 
with a saw, or an axe with an axe, or the individual characteristics of both axes and 
saws in circumstances where the individual theorist’s goal has not been identified in 
toto.   This reflects, in a basic sense, the problems in the Rule of Law’s contestedness.  
These problems can, however, be avoided by focusing on what is common in the 
goals—and not just the desiderata or similarities in the desiderata—as each theo-
rist’s solution to a particular problem.  Together, the abstraction and commonality 
place any distilled element beyond the concept’s contestedness.  By taking this ap-
proach, the problems can be avoided.   
To say something more about my rationale, expanding the metaphor is use-
ful.  Theodore Levitt characterises customers’ attendance at a hardware store seek-
ing to purchase a drill bit in these terms: ‘People don’t want to buy a quarter-inch drill. 
They want a quarter-inch hole’.36  This sentiment expresses a customer’s need behind 
the need.   Let us call this the Fundamental Need.  Here I use ‘fundamental’ as relating 
to a necessary base or a core or, alternatively, relating to central importance.37  The 
use of the definitive ‘the Fundamental Need’ needs explanation.  It is used despite, as 
will become apparent below, there exists potential to abstract further.  (I explore 
this further in Part IV in the section entitled Why not abstract further?)  It could be 
                                                 
34 ibid 262.  See also Raz (n 8) 225–226.   
35 My perspective agrees with Waldron’s suggestion that the Rule of Law is a ‘solution-concept’:  Wal-
dron, ‘Is the Rule of Law an Essentially Contested Concept (in Florida)?’ (n 1) 158. 
36 Clayton M Christensen, Scott Cook and Taddy Hall, ‘Marketing Malpractice: The Cause and the Cure’ 
(2005) 83 Harvard Business Review 74, 76.    
37 ‘Fundamental - Definition of Fundamental in English | Oxford Dictionaries’ (Oxford Dictionaries | 
English) <https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/fundamental> accessed 23 September 2016.   
  Page 11 of 28 
argued that abandoning ‘Fundamental’ or avoidance of the definitive ‘the Fundamen-
tal Need’ may be more appropriate.  This  may, however, increase ambiguity as it 
would not be clear which need is being referred to.  Accordingly, for conceptual 
clarity, and whilst the potential for further abstraction is recognised, ‘the Funda-
mental Need’ or ‘Fundamental Need’ is used here to refer to that which is identifia-
ble as the level of abstracted need capable of being held in common across concep-
tions.  This represents, in effect, the conceptions’ conceptual sweet spot.  It repre-
sents the point at which it is argued maximum practical and pragmatic benefit is ob-
tained.  
Whilst Levitt’s business/marketing concept is far removed from legal theory, 
it can be directly applied to the task at hand.  Statements of commonality in canoni-
cal desiderata merely express a potential solution to an initial need (but not the Fun-
damental Need.)  They reflect a way to solve a problem and not an expression of the 
problem itself.  This will, therefore, not provide a useful comparison as the desider-
ata alone will amount to no more than the identification of a commonality of func-
tional or instrumental approach or process.  Bedner’s suggestion that it will be im-
possible to find a definition pleasing to all as any common ground for the ideas of 
the Rule of Law is thin38 is undoubtedly true unless a mere aesthetic of commonality 
is sought; for example, through basic similarities like the preponderance of calls for 
‘predictability’.   However, exposing a common background purpose as a Fundamen-
tal Need would be meaningful.  This would allow superficially similar surface ex-
pressions to be disambiguated and different surface expressions could be separately 
aggregated.  Identification of a common Fundamental Need in canonical Rule of 
Law conceptions would represent an element—common to all ideas—of the Rule of 
Law that exists beyond the concept’s contestation.  
The common elements—that reflect the Fundamental Need—can be identi-
fied through the inference of intent or purpose: the common sharpness of both an 
axe and saw, when combined with the general nature and possible applications of 
those tools, suggests the goal is cutting; or, more specifically, cutting wood.  From 
two individuals’ selection of these two different tools, an open inference is that they 
                                                 
38 Bedner (n 5) 53.   
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both wish to cut wood.  This is the—commonly held—Fundamental Need (as ex-
pressed through their individual tool selection.)  Rule of Law elements can be identi-
fied in the same way.  By considering a canonical author’s formulation of a Rule of 
Law conception, the end to which the conception is directed can be inferred.  This 
represents that thinker’s Fundamental Need.  Commonality across the Fundamental 
Needs of each canonical author provides the basis for the identification of the ele-
ments of the Rule of Law.  As already noted, I do not intend to suggest that the 
Fundamental Need represents the most basic, or absolute, need that can be inferred 
from the conceptions contained in the Rule of Law canons. Cutting wood is not the 
only need that may be inferred from the tool’s selection; a more abstract need would 
be to make firewood or to generate heat (from burning the cut wood).  In taking this 
further abstracted step any commonality of purpose may, however, be lost.39  With 
commonality as the key ingredient in the Fundamental Need, the Rule of Law ele-
ments only—and specifically—reflect the commonly held Fundamental Need.  By vir-
tue of the elements being derived in this way, the elements—as a reflection of the 
Fundamental Need—are necessary for Rule of Law compliance across all Rule of 
Law canonical conceptions. 
In taking a small step back, a basic question remains.  How can we identify 
the Fundamental Need?  When taken with theorists’ stated goals, Rule of Law de-
siderata will inform the Fundamental Need.  Rule of Law desiderata are useful as 
signposts of the theorists’ intent; eschewing the relevance of these would be to 
throw the baby out with the bathwater as they are an embodiment of the theorists’ 
solution to a problem and are, therefore, suggestive of the ultimate goal: the selec-
tion of an axe or saw (that each have sharpness as a characteristic) rather than a 
hammer (with dullness as a characteristic) suggests the goal is cutting rather than 
striking.  However, it is only in considering a tool’s characteristics in conjunction 
with the general nature of its circumstantial uses that the purpose—of cutting wood 
in this example—can be inferred.  Accordingly, holistic consideration of canonical 
theories and desiderata will be apposite.  
To avoid simply re-stating the broad rationale for the existence of the Rule 
of Law, and to provide some analytical benefit, the Fundamental Need must be a 
                                                 
39 I consider the question of additional abstraction in 4.3 Why not Abstract Further? page 24 below. 
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more specific ideal than the mere avoidance of arbitrary power or the limitation of 
government interference.  Whilst I argue the two elements identified in the follow-
ing part express the Fundamental Need, I do not suggest this is the only way in 
which this may be conceived; again, I am not suggesting the only purpose to be in-
ferred from an axe or tool’s sharpness is cutting wood.   Whilst I will return to this 
point later, it suffices to say simply that cutting wood is an inference that can be 
made and, crucially, it is one that is common across the considered uses.  For the va-
lidity of my argument, any further claim to exclusivity of purpose is unnecessary.  
3. PART  III:  DISTILLING THE ELEMENTS  
In this part, I survey canonical conceptions of the Rule of Law to identify the 
elements defined in the opening pages of this paper:  Comprehension and Procedural 
Pellucidity.  Simply listing the canonical Rule of Law conceptions in attempting to 
distill the elements would be uninteresting and unhelpful.  Accordingly, I propose 
each element and offer evidence for that element through recourse to the relevant 
canonical conceptions.     
3.1 Comprehension as an Element of the Rule of Law  
Comprehension40 as an element of the Rule of Law requires that an individual 
be able to comprehend the nature, content and operation of the rules to which he or 
she is subject.  Two aspects are encompassed in this formulation: that an individual 
must, first, receive and, second, process rules as part of an endeavor shared with an-
other individual or entity.   This reflects the two components of the dictionary defi-
nition:  first, the ability to understand something41 or the faculty of grasping with 
the mind and the capacity to understand fully;42 and, second, the capability of includ-
ing or inclusion.43   By offering general communication as an analogy before going 
on to examine various canonical conceptions, I evidence the way in which Compre-
hension is an element of the Rule of Law.    
                                                 
40 Hereinafter “Comprehension” (with a capital ‘C’) refers to the element of the Rule of Law.   
41 ‘Comprehension - Definition of Comprehension in English | Oxford Dictionaries’ (Oxford Dictionaries | 
English) <https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/comprehension> accessed 23 September 2016.  
42 ‘Definition of “Comprehension”’ (Merriam-Webster Online) <http://www.merriam-webster.com/dic-
tionary/comprehension> accessed 23 September 2016.   
43 ibid; ‘Comprehension - Definition of Comprehension in English | Oxford Dictionaries’ (n 41).     
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In relation to general communication, comprehension has an obvious synon-
ymy with canonical conceptions of the Rule of Law and their associated Rule of Law 
desiderata.  Communicating through writing and speech includes fundamental pre-
requisites to understanding and therefore comprehension.  For example, parties 
must adhere to the same rules.  This includes the adoption and acceptance of com-
mon meanings of words and phrases within the chosen language and the mutual 
agreement to communicate in the same language (or at least in a way that both par-
ties know can be understood by the other).  Furthermore, parties must know in ad-
vance that each will continue to conform to these rules.  In effect, there must be a 
practical ability to understand the form of the communication.  There will not, for 
example, be actual communication in the broad sense, never mind comprehension, 
on the expression of a sentiment out of the earshot of the other party or if it follows 
a structure that makes no grammatical sense.  These final categories are vital, as ad-
herence to all of the other requirements would not, otherwise, facilitate comprehen-
sion.   This suggests comprehension generally requires more than the exchange of 
propositions and the processing of an external input.  It requires that there be a level 
of understanding or appreciation of what and how information is being, and will be, 
communicated.  It also requires internal processing of a proposition through adher-
ence to a set of commonly known and understood norms of conduct that assist the 
internal act of processing, and the formation and structuring of the appropriate out-
puts.   
Comprehension, as a Rule of Law element, reflects these internal and exter-
nal aspects.  Both must be satisfied to facilitate Comprehension.  The internal as-
pect—which I outline in more detail shortly—relates to an individual’s ability to un-
derstand the nature, content and operation of the rules to which he or she is subject.  
The external aspect relates to the way in which the party receives or becomes aware 
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of various norms.  These can be simply stated by listing some of the obvious expres-
sions of relevant desiderata that include calls for clarity,44 consistency or congru-
ence,45 freedom from contradiction,46 or communication/promulgation.47   These re-
late to facets of norm formation external to an individual’s control; in other words, 
they relate to the creation and packaging of a norm before it is received by the indi-
vidual.  
Comprehension as the Fundamental Need behind these requirements pro-
vides a realistic expression of the purpose common in each of these canonical state-
ments.  A party’s (internal) awareness of rules facilitates Comprehension of both the 
existence and application of the rule as well as the rule’s relevance to the party.  The 
fact that there must be rules and they must be general appears to be the least con-
troversial of all Rule of Law desiderata.  Fuller includes this as his first require-
ment;48 it is also a requisite in formulations by and Raz,49 Solum,50 and Hayek.51  A 
requirement for rules by way of written, albeit potentially changeable, laws ex-
pressed in general terms has also been stated as being fundamental to the classical 
conceptions of the Rule of Law.52  For Radin, this requirement formed the first of 
two basic principles of the Rule of Law.53  Dicey’s Rule of Law also reflects the re-
quirement that there be rules and that they be in general terms applicable to all.54  
Whilst both striking and interesting, mere similarity of expression achieves and re-
veals little; this represents only the commonality of desiderata referred to in the pre-
vious part.  Comprehension—as a requirement that an individual be able to compre-
hend the nature, content and operation of the rules to which he or she is subject—is 
                                                 
44 Raz (n 8) 214–5; Fuller (n 12) 63.   
45 Fuller (n 12) 81. 
46 ibid 65.  
47 Regarding the requirement that rules be announced beforehand:  ibid 49; Hayek, The Road to Serfdom (n 
26) 112. Regarding the requirement that an individual have an awareness of the laws of the state in order 
to modify one’s action: Friedrich A von Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty (University of Chicago Press 
1960) 210; Solum (n 20) 122; Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan: With Selected Variants from the Latin Edition of 
1668 (EM Curley ed, New Ed edition, Hackett Publishing Co, Inc 1994) ch 26.   
48 As the principle of ‘Generality’ See Fuller (n 12) 46.    
49 Raz (n 8) 213 and 216. 
50 Solum (n 20) 122.  
51 Hayek, The Road to Serfdom (n 26). See also Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty (n 47) 218–219. 
52 See for example, Aristotle, T Sinclair and Trevor J Saunders, The Politics (Penguin UK 1981) ch 8 and 
16.   
53 Radin (n 11) 785. 
54 AV Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution (9th ed, Macmillan 1939) 202–203.   
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also evidenced across these ideas related to generality as individuals must under-
stand that rules properly made and expressed in general terms will undoubtedly ap-
ply to him or her.55   
Predictability, stability and constancy are frequently included within canoni-
cal Rule of Law formulations.56  When considered in prima facie terms they simply 
represent one small bundle of virtues that, notwithstanding their frequent invoca-
tion, relate to one way of achieving a goal in a particular Rule of Law theory; this is 
akin to the sharpness of a saw or heaviness of an axe.  The reflection of the Funda-
mental Need in these desiderata becomes apparent when we conceive the desiderata 
as requiring an individual to know the rules he or she is subject to in advance, and to 
expect they will remain in force in the form in which they currently exist.  Both re-
late to the parties’ background understanding and beliefs.  In this way, these desid-
erata are of similar effect to the common desideratum that stipulates the necessity 
for prospective laws and rules.57  These desiderata are individually and collectively 
aimed at ensuring parties are put in a position to know, understand and trust the 
continued operation of the rules and are able to predict, with some degree of cer-
tainty and confidence, the rules that will result in the imposition of sanctions.  Raz 
puts it this way: 
The violation of the rule of law can take two forms. It may lead to uncertainty 
or it may lead to frustrated and disappointed expectations. It leads to the first 
when the law does not enable people to foresee future developments or to form 
definite expectations…58 
The internal processing of information by (and the external transmission to) 
a party are represented by the need described by Radin and Fuller in relation to 
                                                 
55 See Jeremy Waldron, ‘Principles of Legislation’ in Richard W Bauman and Tsvi Kahana (eds), The 
Least Examined Branch: The Role of Legislatures in the Constitutional State (Cambridge University Press 
2006) 21.    
56 See for example, Aristotle, Sinclair and Saunders (n 52); Raz (n 8) 215; John Locke, Two Treatises of 
Government (Peter Laslett ed, Student edition., Cambridge University Press 1988) 350–352; Fuller (n 12) 
79; Hayek, The Road to Serfdom (n 26) 114; Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty (n 47) 210.  However, 
Hayek’s views in relation to the operation, but not the necessity, of predictability later changed: Friedrich 
A von Hayek, Law, Legislation and Liberty: A New Statement of the Liberal Principles of Justice and Political 
Economy (1973) 115–118.   
57 See for example, Fuller (n 12) 51; Raz (n 8) 215; Hayek, The Road to Serfdom (n 26) 112; Locke (n 56) 
353; Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty (n 47) 210.   
58 Raz (n 8) 221–222.  
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knowable desiderata.  For Radin, the requirement of ‘knowability’ included the re-
quirements that rules be public, congruent, non-contradictory, clear and relatively 
stable 59  Fuller too prefaces various aspects of his Rule of Law conception with a 
necessary requirement for knowledge:   
This lies in a quality shared by both, namely, that they act by known rule. The 
internal morality of the law demands that there be rules, that they be made 
known, and that they be observed in practice by those charged with their ad-
ministration. These demands may seem ethically neutral so far as the external 
aims of law are concerned. Yet, just as law is a precondition for good law, so 
acting by known rule is a precondition for any meaningful appraisal of the jus-
tice of law. "A lawless unlimited power" expressing itself solely in unpredicta-
ble and patternless interventions in human affairs could be said to be unjust 
only in the sense that it does not act by known rule.60    
Radin also considers the ‘perform-ability’ of desiderata as being in a separate, 
albeit related, category to know-ability.61   This approach is not incorporated—save 
by implication—into the concept of Comprehension.  Explicit inclusion of any im-
possibility desideratum within Comprehension is not required.  The idea that a law 
or rule is required to be capable of performance could be associated with a party’s 
Comprehension only in terms where the party is capable of compliance in any event: 
a law that requires the impossible would be no law.62 In these terms, Comprehension 
(in broad terms) also incorporates—in addition to the purposive intent included in 
the other desiderata outlined above—the requirement that a law must be performa-
ble or, at least, not impossible.   
3.2 Procedural Pellucidity as an Element of the Rule of Law  
The second Rule of Law element—Procedural Pellucidity—requires the cre-
ation and application of any rules to be in terms capable of being clear and obvious 
to all concerned.  In this regard, the process must be transparent and clear, affected 
in a careful and determined way following a process of evaluation, and the resulting 
                                                 
59 Radin (n 11) 786.   
60 Fuller (n 12) 157. (Emphasis added.) 
61 Radin (n 11) 786.   
62 Fuller (n 12) 70.  
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norms and decisions must be expressed clearly by the decision maker (as the norm 
creator or applier).  As Jeremy Waldron has recently been the most outspoken and 
visible advocate for the inclusion of procedural aspects into the Rule of Law, and as 
his statements closely relate to Procedural Pellucidity, I explore his work in some 
detail in this section.   
I begin, however, with some boundary setting.  In reflecting the Fundamen-
tal Need behind the various canonical conceptions of the Rule of Law, Procedural 
Pellucidity has two prongs.  Any decision or decision-maker must clearly and appar-
ently demonstrate both.  These prongs require that, first, a decision-maker consider 
various issues and, second, there be clear communication of the resultant decision.  
Procedural Pellucidity may apply to any rule-maker or decision-maker (whether a 
judge, legislator or any other power wielding decision-making agent of the govern-
ment).63  A further instance of boundary setting is also required.  The definition of 
Procedural Pellucidity, suggests an overlap between the second prong of Procedural 
Pellucidity—that there be clear communication of a decision—and the aspect of 
Comprehension that requires an individual to be able to comprehend the nature, 
content and operation of the rules.  Although the overlap is not fatal—or even prob-
lematic in the terms of this assessment or the formulation of the elemental scheme 
generally—in the hope that the existence of Procedural Pellucidity can initially be 
considered on its own merits, I defer discussion of the overlap until Part IV.    
The first prong—that a decision-maker consider various issues—is apparent 
across canonical conceptions.  Whilst procedural values have recently gained wide 
acceptance following the inclusion—either directly or by implication—of procedural 
components in conceptions by, inter alia, Lon Fuller, Joseph Raz and Jeremy Wal-
dron,64 the concept is not new.  Aristotle, by way of decrying the making of hasty 
and emotion-fueled decisions, refers to the requirement for the inclusion of some 
form of (what would now be deemed) legislative due process.65  Whilst care should 
be taken in interpreting Aristotle’s comments in the modern Western tradition, it is 
                                                 
63 This is not to rule out the potential operation of the Rule of Law in private law.  See Austin and Klim-
chuk (n 9) 1. 
64 n 73 below and accompanying text.  See also, Raz (n 8) 214–217.    
65 Aristotle, Rhetoric (W Rhys Roberts tr, Dover 2004) bk 1 ch 1.  
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apparent there is some call for a level of ‘cool headedness’ and the avoidance of im-
passioned decision making.  Dicey famously propounded a similar due process re-
quirement through the sentiment that ‘no man is punishable or can lawfully be made 
to suffer in body or goods except for a distinct breach of law established in the ordi-
nary legal manner before the ordinary Courts of the land’.66  Whilst this view has 
not escaped criticism,67 and although his insistence on the Courts alone as an en-
forcement mechanism may have been shortsighted, it is apparent the conception is 
formal68 and the broad aim is clearly procedural. 
Ronald Cass concludes that  ‘[a]dherence to the rule of law slows down 
changes in the system, increases the foreseeability of change, makes change less the 
product of one individual’s will than of the more regularized and intricate inter-
weaving of different wills and priorities.’69  Cass Sunstein also imports a similar re-
quirement together with requirements for: the separation of law-making and adjudi-
cative processes and minimal due process requirements; hearing rights and availabil-
ity of review by independent adjudicative officials; a separation between law-making 
and law-implementation; and the prevention of rapid changes in laws’ content.70  
Raz’s laundry list of desiderata echoes this common procedural function by requir-
ing that the making of laws be guided by clear and transparent rules and that natural 
justice is to be observed within courts that are easily accessible.71   Waldron, follow-
ing a consideration of the Diceyean approach, concludes that of ‘[t]he legislature, 
the judiciary, and the executive--each must have its separate say before power im-
pacts on the individual.’72  He also identifies procedural elements in the work of Raz 
and Dicey and a procedural component to the work of E. P. Thompson.73  Fuller’s 
                                                 
66 Dicey (n 54) 110.   
67 See for example, Kenneth Culp Davis, Discretionary Justice: A Preliminary Inquiry. (University of Illinois 
Press 1969) 35. 
68 Craig (n 7) 470.  (Here, ‘formal’ is used in a sense opposite to substantial and not in the more limited 
sense as relating solely to the way in which a law is made. ) 
69 Ronald A Cass, ‘Property Rights Systems and the Rule of Law’ in Enrico Colombatto (ed), The Elgar Com-
panion to the Economics of Property Rights (Elgar 2004) 226. 
70 Cass R Sunstein, ‘Rules and Rulelessness, (Program in Law & Economics Working Paper No. 27)’ 15.  
71 Raz (n 8) 214–217. 
72 Jeremy J Waldron, ‘Separation of Powers in Thought and Practice’ [2013] Boston College Law Re-
view 433, 459.    
73 Jeremy Waldron, ‘The Rule of Law and the Importance of Procedure’ in James E Fleming (ed), Getting 
to the rule of law (New York University Press 2011) 10.   
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conception, Waldron suggests,  ‘has to do with legislative form, not judicial proce-
dure…’74 and, augmentation of Fuller’s desiderata with a further extensive set of 
procedural requirements is necessary else we ‘radically sell short the idea of the Rule 
of Law’.75  Waldron advocates procedural ideas—legislative and judicial—in his own 
work.  In relation to legislative law making, he suggests a list of procedural princi-
ples of legislation that require, inter alia, disagreement must be allowed, a forum 
must give voice and general consideration to issues raised, deliberation and debate 
be engaged in and due care must be taken. 76  The distinction here appears to be one 
between formal in a narrow sense (relating only to the rules regarding making a 
law) and the process of applying the law;  Waldron accords procedure only the nar-
row interpretation.  (Although procedural is conceived of in a slightly broader con-
text in the present investigation, there seems to be little that ultimately turns on 
this differentiation.)  One reading of Waldron’s desiderata could be restricted to the 
operation of a hearing before some form of tribunal.  On this—more restrictive—
interpretation, the desiderata largely reflect a list of due process requirements.  This 
appears to be conceded in a later passage where he states ‘[t]he point is that there is 
very little about due process or courtroom procedure in Fuller’s account of law’s in-
ternal morality…’77 The other desiderata suggested by Waldron, also largely relate 
to the narrowly defined requirements of due process.78  In this respect, it is no sur-
prise that Waldron’s conception of procedure is narrower than that representing the 
Fundamental Need encompassed by Procedural Pellucidity.  Waldron has also sug-
gested a wider interpretation.  It is not enough, he says, to simply state ‘plaintiff 
wins’, as satisfaction of the Rule of Law may require articulation of exactly why that 
party has won; and this could extend to the existence of a right to reasons for a deci-
sion.79   These aspects are reflected in Procedural Pellucidity as satisfaction requires 
there to be clear communication of reasons for any decision and that there must be 
                                                 
74 ibid 9.    
75 ibid 6–7.  
76 Waldron, ‘Principles of Legislation’ (n 55) 18.   
77 Waldron, ‘The Rule of Law and the Importance of Procedure’ (n 73) 8.  
78 ibid.  (These include: rights to a hearing before a trained judicial officer; to legal representation; to pre-
sent evidence and arguments; to confront witnesses; and, to be present at critical stages of the proceed-
ing.)    
79 ibid; Jeremy Waldron, ‘Stare Decisis and the Rule of Law: A Layered Approach’ 17. 
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consideration of the arguments presented.  Where the idea of procedure is being ap-
plied to the wider process of law making—relating to the contact of all wings of the 
Government referred to by both Dicey and Waldron80—it is not anticipated that the 
meaning and description of ‘procedural’ will be stretching the concept too far.  Each 
of these ideas of the Rule of Law suggest a commonality of purpose that requires 
there to be careful, and obvious, consideration of decisions during decision-making 
or in affecting rules.  These are reflected in the first prong of Procedural Pellucidity.   
The second aspect—that there be communication of any decision—can be 
very briefly stated.  This is both explicitly part of the various procedural concep-
tions already noted as well as a necessary implication in circumstances where, as has 
already been demonstrated, there is a frequently stated requirement for the Rule of 
Law to be promulgated.81    
As will be apparent from the exploration of these procedural ideas of the Rule 
of Law, there is a requirement that there be clarity in both processes of evaluation 
and determination and in the expression of those norms.  This brief review suggests 
Procedural Pellucidity as a reflection of the Fundamental Need—that the creation 
and application of any rules must be in terms capable of being clear and obvious to 
all concerned—is held in common across and can be inferred from the various ca-
nonical conceptions of the Rule of Law. 
4. PART IV: ELEMENTS OF THE RULE OF LAW: SUMMARY AND OBJECTIONS   
Through their ready identification within—or at least behind—the canonical 
conceptions referred to above, Comprehension and Procedural Pellucidity are ele-
ments of the Rule of Law that—given the theoretically agnostic process of distilla-
tion and their reflection of the Fundamental Need expressed in canonical concep-
tions—provide a way to assess Rule of Law non-compliance regardless of the canon-
ical conception preferred.  Where Comprehension and Procedural Pellucidity (re-
spectively) require an individual to be able to comprehend the nature, content and 
operation of the rules to which he or she is subject and, require the creation and ap-
                                                 
80 n 66 and 72 above. 
81 n 47 above and associated text. 
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plication of any rules to be in terms capable of being clear and obvious to all con-
cerned, it is apparent that both processes and outcome are critical to Rule of Law 
compliance.  By way of a quick ‘sense check’, this does not immediately contradict 
popular or intuitive ideas of what the Rule of Law is.   The elements provide a prag-
matic solution to the problems highlighted at the start of this paper.  They enable 
identification of whether a rule-maker’s actions or a rule as made are capable of com-
plying with any one of a variety of canonical Rule of Law conceptions without hav-
ing recourse to each conception individually, having to select a hybrid model or hav-
ing to formulate a novel Rule of Law conception.  Furthermore, given the way in 
which the elements have been identified—as a reflection of the commonly held Fun-
damental Need across canonical conceptions—they exist beyond the concept’s cur-
rent state of contestedness.  I have no doubt that questions or objections exist.  Ac-
cordingly, I attempt to preempt some objections, by posing and briefly answering 
five questions.   
4.1 Can the Elements Unify the Conceptions/Remedy the Contestedness?  
Given the contestedness of the Rule of Law—and if it is correct that the Rule 
of Law is, as is widely accepted to be the case, an essentially contested concept—
wouldn’t the existence of any element (as defined herein) be a misnomer and an ir-
relevance as there can be no such unifying principle between conceptions?82  Should 
it be asserted that Comprehension and Procedural Pellucidity operate as a direct 
bridge between various conceptions this objection could not be denied.  However, 
that is not the claim.  Should that be the claim, it would be like stating an axe is ac-
tually a saw.   Or, more specifically, like stating that an axe can be conceived of as 
being conceptually and fundamentally a saw simply by virtue of the purpose to 
which the tool is being put.  Care has been taken to avoid that position.   The ele-
ments proposed reflect a common Fundamental Need.  This need does not bridge 
between conceptions—or even the contest between them—but, instead, looks to the 
purposive intent behind the conceptions.  The connection is one of purpose alone; as 
the purpose is the Fundamental Need that the canonical author seeks to address by 
                                                 
82 This question could be considered as making a straw man out of Gallie’s idea of essential contestability.  
(I thank the anonymous reviewer for highlighting this position.)  I do not take issue with that suggestion.  
However, I retain the question as an objection as it usefully highlights the operation of the elemental 
scheme as the objection could also be raised absent essential contestability.  
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providing his/her Rule of Law conception as a solution to a problem.  In terms of 
the axe/saw analogy, these are tools useful in the act of cutting down a tree.  This is 
not to suggest these are the sole uses for either tool or that they are the only tool 
for the job; after all, a saw can also be used for cutting timber or as a musical instru-
ment and an axe can be utilised as a weapon of war or be used—perhaps, by either a 
fire fighter or Jack Nicholson’s character in the Shining—to gain access to a locked 
room.   For these reasons, the Fundamental Need does not suggest the elements 
provide a unifying theory of the Rule of Law.  In fact, the suggestion is precisely 
that the elements—by simply indicating commonality of purpose—avoid having to 
determine or state these things.  Further, as the elements exist at a state of abstrac-
tion removed from the plane on which the contest currently takes place, the con-
test—whether properly characterised as being essentially contested or not—cannot 
directly be solved through the proposed methodology.  As already noted, I aim only 
to solve the problems outlined at the start of this paper by going beyond the contest 
iteself.  
4.2 Does the Overlap Between the Elements Result in a Problem?  
The cohabitation of the same conceptual terrain by the two elements does 
not represent a conflict in the true sense of the word, as the elements’ operation is 
not exclusive.  As alluded to already, both processes and outcomes are crucial to 
Rule of Law compliance.  The two elements exist on a single spectrum flowing be-
tween processes and outcomes.  Procedural Pellucidity is exclusively situated at the 
processes end of the spectrum as a consequence of its role in the making of norms; 
Comprehension exclusively occupies the outcomes end of the spectrum as a result of 
its relation to the internal processing of information (provided by the norms).  In the 
middle, is the ‘overlap’ where there is a dual concern between the elements regard-
ing the expression or communication of norms.  This ‘overlap’, however, does not 
result in a mixing of the elements’ function.  The two elements relate to different 
sources: Procedural Pellucidity to norm-makers and appliers; and Comprehension to 
norm-followers.  It is due to this exclusivity of source application that the two ele-
ments cannot, and should not, be collapsed together.   
What would it mean if an action facilitates Comprehension but not Proce-
dural Pellucidity (or vice versa)?  The answer is deceptively straightforward: non-
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satisfaction of either one of the elements means Rule of Law compliance does not 
follow.   This result obtains as both elements are necessary (but not sufficient) ele-
ments of the Rule of Law conceptions.  Although a small area of ‘overlap’ may exist, 
neither element covers the entire field.  An action that supports only one element 
would leave a substantial necessary area of the Rule of Law unsatisfied.   It is only 
together that the elements facilitate Rule of Law compliance; non-satisfaction of ei-
ther element is sufficient to result in Rule of Law non-compliance.   
4.3 Why not Abstract Further?83 
Further abstraction is, of course, possible.  However, in considering two in-
stances of further abstraction, abstracting beyond the Fundamental Need results in a 
loss of pragmatic benefits or practical application of the elemental scheme.  In other 
words, altering the level of abstraction—in either direction from the Fundamental 
Need—can result in a less desirable solution to the problems outlines at the start of 
this paper.  In this respect, the line in the sand drawn by the elements I propose rep-
resents an attempt to achieve the maximum pragmatic benefit.  
The first instance of further abstraction beyond the Fundamental Need has 
already been mentioned above.  This would—in tool related terms—suggest the 
purpose to be inferred from the use of an axe is firewood or heat, and not merely 
cutting down a tree.  To accurately abstract to each canonical author’s specific goal 
would require a complete appreciation of the precise intentions and motivations re-
sulting in the formulation of the Rule of Law conception.  Even if an exhaustive 
study of each canonical author were undertaken, the result would remain specula-
tive.  The less abstract the inference—and the closer to the conception communi-
cated in the canons—the less speculation is required.  In addition, as each author’s 
ultimate aim may have differed slightly as a result of each conceiving of the problem 
in slightly different terms, it seems likely that a divergence in those goals would oc-
cur when further abstraction is considered.  Accordingly, consideration of the more 
abstract goal makes convergence and commonality of purpose less likely to be 
achieved or identified.  For these reasons, attempts to divine a more abstract purpose 
appears to be both impractical and fruitless.  
                                                 
83 I thank Claudio Michelon of the University of Edinburgh for posing this question following a general 
discussion of my methodology. 
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 There is a second, and different, instance of abstraction.  Couching a general 
conception of the elemental content of the Rule of Law in more abstract terms is 
possible via recourse to the, largely uncontroversial, overly broad idea of the Rule of 
Law referred to at the start of this paper: that the Rule of Law is nothing more than 
some level of normative force that acts on a rule-maker in a way that, ultimately, 
prevents the exercise of arbitrary power.   At some stage along the continuum of ab-
straction toward this ‘ultimate’ position, the act of abstraction itself becomes point-
less; the level of abstraction results in the idea becoming, in practical terms, devoid 
of meaning.  Of course, the same result obtains in the opposite circumstance: ab-
stracting less results in the non-avoidance of the instant issue of contestedness and, 
hence, the assessment would provide no benefit.  For all of these reasons, a line in 
the sand is required.  The intention behind the line-placement suggested by the ele-
mental conception proposed herein seeks to bisect the problems raised by the titular 
questions posed below—Are there pragmatic benefits? and, Why not use another concep-
tion?—and the concept’s general maelstrom of contestedness.   
4.4 Are there any Real Pragmatic Benefits? 
I provide two brief examples to illustrate the elements—though abstract—do 
still provide pragmatic benefits.  The elements are necessarily more abstract than 
the conceptions from which they are distilled, but they are not so broad as to be ir-
reconcilable with any Rule of Law-relevant example.   
There is little doubt that aspects of the Nazi regime would not pass the ele-
mental Rule of Law muster.  In considering the Roehm Purge84 it is clear there 
would be a complete failure of Procedural Pellucidity.  This means the events and 
actions could not be said to satisfy the Rule of Law in any canonical conception.  
However, this extreme example alone provides little benefit regarding the location 
of the metaphorical line in the sand.  If the elemental scheme is to have any value it 
must at least have some potential in determining, or, at least, not excluding, the 
‘hard’ cases.  A second example that is intuitively (potentially) more ambiguous will 
assist.  An Australian Prime Minister announced the next sitting parliament would 
                                                 
84 The Roehm Purge occurred when Hitler ordered, and retroactively authorised, mass murders before 
stating that the court of Germany had consisted of himself.  See Lon L Fuller, ‘Positivism and Fidelity to 
Law: A Reply to Professor Hart’ (1958) 71 Harvard Law Review 630, 650.    
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retrospectively criminalise a particular act from the date of the announcement.85  
The making of the announcement arguably—in some conceptions of the Rule of 
Law—may negate the retrospectivity that would ordinarily be fatal (in criminal 
matters).  Of the various conceptions that vehemently oppose retrospectivity, 
Fuller’s is one of the best known:  ‘Taken by itself, and in abstraction from its possi-
ble function in a system of laws that are largely prospective, a retroactive law is 
truly a monstrosity.’86  Although space does not afford opportunity to provide a de-
tailed examination regarding the elements, a cursory consideration suggests two 
considerations of note.  First, the Prime Minister’s announcement may be able to 
obviate invalidity due to retrospectivity as Comprehension may be facilitated 
through the manner, nature and content of the announcement (notwithstanding the 
specific legislative steps necessary to criminalise an act).87  Procedural Pellucidity 
would substantially be satisfied on the passing of the Act in the normal course of 
parliamentary procedures.  But, it seems, there would be no Rule of Law compliance 
at the point of the announcement; compliance may only achieved through the two 
acts separated in time.  However, and this is the second point, it is not immediately 
apparent there is a slam-dunk answer as there remains some wiggle room in relation 
to the application and precise terms of the internal and external operation of Com-
prehension in the given example.   
These examples—in circumstances where the elemental scheme is intended 
only to operate as a shorthand way to identify Rule of Law non-compliance—sug-
gest the line in the sand is in a position that retains some analytic value and does not 
create a category that is either too broad to be devoid of purpose or too narrow so as 
to exclude any potential application.  However, where satisfaction of Comprehension 
and Procedural Pellucidity would not guarantee ultimate Rule of Law compliance—
there may be other reasons that impact that outcome—the elemental scheme can be 
seen to be doing some work in two senses: first, it disposes of the relatively clear 
                                                 
85 This example has previously been applied by Waldron.  See Jeremy Waldron, ‘Retroactive Law: How 
Dodgy Was Duynhoven?’ (2004) 10 Otago Law Review 631, 634–636.  The act in question related to the 
making of hoax threats of Anthrax having been posted to institutions.  Although Waldron uses the ex-
ample to differentiate retroactive and retrospective legislation, the illustration works equally well here.  
86 Fuller (n 12) 53.  
87 Putting aside the obvious issue that the mere words of a Prime Minister are not constitutive of a le-
gally binding norm.  
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Nazi example; and second, it leaves open the somewhat ambiguous example for fur-
ther examination.  On this basis, the line in the sand appears to be in broadly the 
right place for the immediate identification of non-compliance.  In other words, the 
scheme is able to provide the pragmatic benefit of being able to rapidly and easily 
determine an instance of non-compliance without having recourse to all canonical 
conceptions separately.   The theoretical agnosticism inherent in this approach re-
sults in the ability to draw a more robust conclusion to any analysis.   
4.5 Why not use an Existing Conception? 
The immediate response to this question harks back to the issues posed ear-
lier in the paper: in terms where the content of the Rule of Law is not settled, adop-
tion of a single or hybrid methodology is open to immediate criticism.  However, the 
question could also relate to the criticism of the use of the elemental scheme in a 
way that supplants existing canonical Rule of Law conceptions.  Should this be the 
thrust of the question, the response is that there does still remain a need to use the 
existing canonical conceptions.  I am not suggesting the elemental conception sup-
plants, replaces or is superior to those conceptions.  Indeed, that cannot be the case 
where the elements—as necessary and not sufficient aspects of the Rule of Law—are 
limited to identifying only non-compliance.  So, on this basis, it will still ultimately 
be necessary to have recourse to other, existing, conceptions if non-compliance is 
not established.    
5. PART V: CONCLUSION 
I have argued two elements of the Rule of Law can be distilled from canoni-
cal Rule of Law conceptions and that these provide a theory agnostic way to estab-
lish Rule of Law non-compliance.  The Fundamental Need behind Rule of Law ca-
nonical conceptions represents commonality of thinkers’ purpose and this common-
ality is reflected in the elements.  The two necessary Rule of Law elements (alt-
hough there may be more) can be used to identify non-compliance with the Rule of 
Law in a way that satisfies all canonical conceptions.  This approach avoids the 
problems and criticisms associated with the adoption of part or all of one or many 
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canonical conceptions or the logistical impracticability associated with the genera-
tion of a bespoke complete Rule of Law theory.  In this way, the elemental approach 
facilitates a robust and practical methodology for identifying Rule of Law non-com-
pliance.  
  
